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THE ABIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ETHICS OF INSIGHT 
RoBERT M. DoRAN 
Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA 
The problem that I wish to address can be specified by adverting to Bernard 
Lonergan's acknowledgment in his 1973 paper 'Insight Revisited' that significant 
developments had taken place in his articulation of the notion of the good between 
the publication of Insight and the completion of Method in Theology. There has 
been something of a tendency among Lonergan students to see this adrriission as 
an indication that in Lonergan's later view chapter 2 of Method should replace 
chapter 18 of Insight. No matter what Lonergan's position on this question was, I 
wish to suggest that simply replacing the position of Insight with that of Method 
would result in a position on the good and on decision that is just as incomplete 
as would be the position one would entertain were one to refuse to consider any 
account other than the one presented in Insight. My position is that there is a 
limited validity to both accounts, and the limit is imposed not by the objective 
content of the accounts themselves but by the state of the human subject who 
would employ either method in making a decision. 1 
My paper has three parts. In the first, I summarize conclusions reached 
in earlier work to the effect that the ethics of chapter 18 of Insight presents in 
philosophic terms the general form of the method of making decisions that St 
Ignatius Loyola calls the 'third time of election,' while the ethics of Method in 
Theology presents in philosophic terms the general form of St Ignatius's 'second 
time.' Since each 'time' has a limited validity, each of Lonergan's accounts of the 
good and of decision would also have its proper justification. This will constitute 
my first argument for the abiding significance of the ethics of Insight. A second 
1 M y interest focuses on the respective noúons of the good in lnsight and Method in Theology and on the 
suggested structures of rational self-consciousness (lnsight) or existential responsibility (Method in Theology) 
corresponding to these respecúve notions. Recently Patrick Byrne has provided a valuable commentary 
on and critique of the argument of chapter 18 of lnsight with which 1 concur, but far from criticizing 
the idenúfication of the good with the intelligent and reasonable Byrne's arúcle strengthens Lonergan's 
argument in favor of that identificaúon. 1 hope to make a limited contribution in the same direction. See 
Patrick Byrne, 'The Goodness of Being in Lonergan's lnsight,' American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
18 (2007) 43-72. 
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argument for the continued validity of the approach taken in chapter 18 of 
Insíght líes in the fact that the chapter displays the dynamic consciousness that is 
employed in the psychological Trinitarian analogy found in Lonergan's work, and 
especially in De Deo Trino: Pars systematíca (now available with English facing 
pages as volume 12 of Lonergan's Collected Works, The Tríune God: Systematícs). 
In fact, this early analogy of Lonergan' s may prove to be of assistance in filling 
sorne lacunae in Insíght's account of the dynamic structure of the relation between 
knowing and deciding.2 In the third part, 1 argue that the notion of existential 
autonomy presented in The Triune God: Systematics, which relies on and in sorne 
ways expands the account of dynamic consciousness that is found in chapter 18 
of Insíght, is necessary if Lonergan's intentionality analysis is to be integrated with 
René Girard's 'interdividual psychology.' Such an integration is important if 1 am 
correct in my view that two of the most important intellectual breakthroughs to 
come from Catholic thinkers in the twentieth century - breakthroughs for culture 
in general and not simply for the Church- are Lonergan's intentionality analysis 
and Girard's mimetic theory. lt is significant that these breakthroughs are both 
studies of desire. Integrating them with one another will provide, I believe, a more 
complete account of human desire than either of them alone offers. Moreover, the 
anticipation of that more complete account will bring our reflections full circle, 
returning us to the theme of discernment with which we began, since Lonergan 
and Girard together can greatly advance the Catholic tradition's understanding of 
what lgnatian language has called the discernment of spirits. The advance is by way 
of shifting the articulation of our understanding of discernment from description 
to explanation. 
Because the first two sections represent summary statements of positions that 1 
have articulated more fully in other publications, while the third section presents 
the majar field of m y present research and thinking, 1 will devote more attention to 
the third section than to the first two. 
l. The Ethics of lnsight and St lgnatius Loyola's 'Third !une ofElection' 
In this section 1 wish to review and summarize work linking Lonergan' s two 
accounts of ethics with St lgnatius Loyola's times of election. More precisely, 
because of time constraints 1 will limit these considerations to the connection I 
have suggested between chapter 18 of Insíght and the third time of election in the 
Spírítual Exercíses of St lgnatius, barely mentioning a similar connection between 
chapter 2 of Method in Theology and St lgnatius' s second time of election.3 
2 These lacunae are spotted incisively in Byme' s article mentioned in the previous note. 
3 For the fuller account, see Robert M. Doran, 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan,' 
Toronto ]ournal o/ Theology 22:1 (2006) 39-54; 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: 
Revisiting a Topic That Deserves Further Reflection,' Lonergan Workshop 19, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston 
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As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Lonergan's acknowledgment in 
1973 that significant developments had taken place in bis articulation of the notion 
of the good between the publication of Insight and the completion of Method in 
Theology has led sorne interpreters to suppose that Lonergan wished to replace the 
approach to ethics in Insight with that found in Method. M y position is that there 
is a limited validity to both accounts, and the limit is imposed by the state of the 
human subject making a decision at a given point in bis or her life. 
Because I have gone into a fair amount of detall on this question in other 
presentations, I will be very brief here in summarizing m y position. A number of 
years ago it occurred to me that there might be sorne correspondence between 
Lonergan's two accounts of the human good and of decision and St Ignatius 
Loyola's times of election, as proposed in bis .Spiritual Exercises. I first suggested 
these connections in Theology and the Dialectics o/ History,4 and have developed 
them considerably in the past few years. St Ignatius proposes in the Exercises three 
times for making a 'sound and good election.'5 Each of these 'times' is really a 
mode of proceeding, and in each case the mode of proceeding depends on the 
interior state in which one finds oneself when one is faced with having to make a 
decision. The three modes of proceeding are all valid, but only one of them will be 
proper or useful at a given time, and what determines the mode one will employ 
is precisely the interior conditions in which one finds oneself: in Heidegger' s term, 
one's Befindlichkeit.6 The first time is exemplified in St Paul and St Matthew, who 
were so moved that there was no possibility of doubt as to what they were to 
do. The second time calls for the discernment of the pulls and counterpulls of 
affectivity, in the reading of consolations and desolations. In the third time, one is 
tranquil, and sois free to employ one' s intelligence, rationality, and moral existential 
responsibility, one's 'natural powers,' freely and quietly. 
The three times are exhaustive. Either God has so moved one that there are no 
further questions, or this has not happened. If it has not happened, either one is 
pulled in various directions affectively, or one is not. If one is, one is in St Ignatius's 
College, 2006) 83 -106; 'Discernment and Lonergan's Fourth Level of Consciousness,' Gregorianum 89:4 
(2008) 790-802. 
4 Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics o/ History (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990, 
2001) 57-58,87-88 . 
.5 Spiritual Exercises o/ St. Ignatius Loyola, trans. Henry Keane, S.J. (London: Burns Oates and 
Washbourne, 1952) 61. 
6 Martín Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J ohn Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1962) index, 'state-of-mind.' A former student of mind, Ravi Michael Louis, S.]., has argued that 
the basic Sorge is really discernment. This argument appeared in an unpublished paper that he wrote for a 
course that 1 taught, 'The Christian lmagination: Sorne Operative Symbols.' This connects with my use in 
Theology and the Dialectics o/ History of Eric V oegelin' s phrase 'the search for direction in the movement 
of life.' See Eric Voegelin, 'The Gospel and Culture,' in ]esus and Man's Hope, ed. Donald G. Miller and 
Dikran Y. Hadidian, vol. 2 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1971) passim. 
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second time, and one relies on the various suggestions provided for discerning the 
pulls and counterpulls of affective inclinations in order to determine where they 
lead and whether they lead to what is truly or only apparently good. If one is not, 
one is in St Ignatius's third time, and relies on one's native powers of intelligence 
and reason and on the inner demand for consistency between what one knows and 
what one does. 
That St Ignatius's third time corresponds to Insight's account of the good and 
of decision is confirmed by the two methods the Saint propases for making an 
election in the third time. F or each of them is a matter of being 'intelligent and 
reasonable,' which is exactly how Lonergan describes the good as it is presented 
in Insight.7 In the first method, one weighs, in the light of the service of God, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives, precisely to see 'to which side 
reason most inclines.'8 And in the second, one imagines oneself counseling another 
on the same issues and asks oneself what one would advise the other to do, or one 
imagines oneself at the point of death or at the day of judgment, and then one asks 
oneself what one would wish one had done. In either case, one's decision flows 
from reasonable judgment based on a grasp of evidence. In the language of Insight, 
'the value is the good as the possible object of rational choice.'9 
1 note here especially Lonergan's use of the word 'value,' for while there is no 
mention ofjudgments of value in Insight except in the discussion ofbelief in chapter 
20, still there is in Insight a notion of value. Section 1.3 of chapter 18 is entitled 'The 
Notion of Value,' and it is clear in reading that section that the phrase means 'the 
dynamic exigence of rational consciousness for self-consistency' between knowing 
and doing. 10 This is precisely the exigence that governs St lgnatius's 'third time 
of election.' One questions 'to which side reason most inclines,' and once that 
question has been answered, one experiences a moral exigence to act accordingly. 
The question, To which side does reason most incline? is answered in what Lonergan 
in Insight calls 'the practica! insight' (section 2.3) and 'practica! reflection' (section 
2.4), both of which lead to a judgment concerning the reasonable possibility of a 
certain course of action. The judgment is not called a judgment of value or even 
a practica! judgment, but simply a judgment.11 lt is such considerations as these 
7 
'In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable.' Bernard Lonergan, 'lnsight Revited,' in A 
Second Collection, ed. William F.J Ryan, S.J., and BernardJ. Tyrrell, S.J. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1996) 277. Byrne's article refers to the list of questions that Lonergan suggests the subject might ask, 
questions that complement those suggested by St lgnatius in his presentation of the third time. 
8 Spiritual Exercises 63. 
9 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study o/ Human Understanding, vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 
624. 
10 Ibid., 625. 
11 There is a fascinating study waiting to be made of the development of Lonergan's thought on 
judgments of value. I do not think that the position on judgments of value that is expressed in Method in 
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that have led meto suggest that chapter 18 of Insight be regarded as presenting in 
philosophical terms the general form of St Ignatius's third time of election. And if 
that is correct, then we have a first argument for the permanent validity of Insight's 
account of the good and of human decision. 12 · 
2. The Ethics of Insight and the Psychological Analogy 
M y second argument for the permanent validity of the ethical position presented 
in Insight appeals to the role that this position plays in establishing the contours 
of the psychological analogy for the Trinitarian processions presented in The 
Triune God: Systematics, that is, in Lonergan's two Latín treatises in Trinitarian 
systematics, Divinarum personarum and De Deo Trino: Pars systematica. More 
precisely, Lonergan's two accounts of decision provide, respectively, the elements 
of two distinct but complementary approaches to a psychological analogy for a 
systematic understanding of T rinitarian processions and relations. But again, time 
constraints do not permit meto go into detall on the correlation between Method's 
account of decision and Lonergan' s la ter articulation of the psychological analogy. 13 
In the first psychological analogy found in Lonergan's work, which is the 
Theology emerged until about 1967. The expression occurs earlier, of course, but either in the context of 
the discussion of belief, where one makes 'a judgment on the value of deciding to believe with certitude 
or with probability that sorne proposition certainly or probably is true or false' (Insight 730), oras a term 
to describe the same judgment that is spoken of simply as a judgment in chapter 18 of Insight. There is an 
evolution of the latter usage from the 'iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris' of Divinarum personarum 
conceptio analogica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1957, 1959) to the simple 'iudicium valoris' of De 
Deo Trino: Pars systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964). See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune 
God: Systematics, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007) 181. See also Byrne, 'The Goodness of Being in Lonergan's Insight' 
59-60. 
12 A related issue concerns the so-called 'fourth level of consciousness.' It is well known that there is 
no explicit mention of a fourth level in Insight. If in fact the account of decision in Instght does imply the 
affirmation of a fourth level, that level would consist only of the further element of free choice that Insight 
adds to the cognitional process of experience, understanding, and judgment. The mode of proceeding 
that is suggested in Method in Theology, which I suggest presents in philosophical terms the general form 
of St Ignatius's second time of election, entails a far more fulsome fourth level, which emerges when and 
only when one is proceeding according to this mode. The fourth level would include everything from the 
apprehension of possible values in feelings, through the discernment of these feelings and the judgment of 
value that concludes the process of discernment, to the decision itself. There remains the further question, 
however, which I raised in a recent article, asto whether we must dispense with 'level' language entirely 
and simply talk about sublating and sublated operations and states. See Robert M. Doran, 'Addressing the 
Four-point Hypothesis,' Theological Studies 68 (2007) 680. I believe too much ink has been spilled over the 
question of how many levels there are; the spatial metaphor is interfering with the real question of sublating 
and sublated operations and states. 
13 For more on this question, see Doran, 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: 
Revisiting a Topic That Deserves Further Reflection' 96-99. See also Robert M. Doran, 'Being in Love with 
God: A Source of Analogies for Theological Understanding,' Irish Theological Quarterly 7Y{2008) 227-
e. . 
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analogy that he has developed most fully, the analogue in the creature is found 
in those moments of existential self-constitution in which the subject grasps the 
sufficiency of evidence regarding what it would be good for one to be, utters 
the judgment of value, 'This is good,' and proceeds to decisions commensurate 
with that grasp of evidence and judgment of value. The analogy is in the order of 
existential self-constitution or of what in The Triune God: Systematics Lonergan 
calls 'existential autonomy.' We will investigate the notion of autonomy more in 
the next section. lt is sufficient at present to acknowledge that, from the act of 
grasping the evidence, there proceeds the act of judging value, and from the two 
acts together there proceeds the love that embraces the good and carries it out. 
This is precisely the account of decision presented in lnsight, even if the wording 
is different. The analogy consists in the fact that in divine self-constitution, from 
the Father's grasp of the grounds for affirming the goodness of all that the Father 
is and knows, there proceeds the eterna! Word of the Father saying Y esto it all, 
a Word that is a judgment of value, 14 and from the F ather and the W ord together 
there proceeds the eterna! Love that is the Holy Spirit. This theology of God's 
own self-constitution in knowledge, word, and love is informed by an analogy 
with human rational self-consciousness as Lonergan has understood the latter in 
lnsight. One's self-appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness in the form in 
which it is presented in lnsight, or again as it functions in a commonsense mode in 
St Ignatius's presentation of the 'third time' of election, thus entails the recognition 
that those processes, those processions, that mode of making a decision, constitute 
an image of the Trinitarian processions themselves. 
While 1 cannot here go into detall regarding Lonergan' s second articulation of 
the psychological analogy, 15 the analogy is that, as moral integrity in the account in 
Method is a function of generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love 
in an unqualified way, andas those judgments of value are carried out in decisions 
that are acts of loving, so the Father is infinite and eterna! being-in-love, an agape 
that generates a Word, the eterna! Y es that is the Son, a Word that breathes love, 
a Y es that grounds the Proceeding Love that is breathed forth as from agape and 
from its manifestation in such a Word. While the being-in-love that provides the 
starting point of the analogy may be any of the three variants of love that Lonergan 
14 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 181. 
n The principal difference is in the starting point of the analogy. 'The psychological analogy [ ... ] 
has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that 
is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the 
judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature. 
'Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is idenúfied with 
agape (1 John 4:8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which 
is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is 
identified with the Holy Spirit.' Bernard Lonergan, 'Christology Today: Methodological Considerations,' 
in A Third Collection , ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 93. 
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acknowledges- love in the family, lave in the community, and the unrestricted 
being-in-love that is sanctifying grace- the possibility is open for an analogy in 
the arder of grace itself. The dynamic state of being in lave in an unqualified way 
is what theology has traditionally called sanctifying grace, and Lonergan speaks of 
sanctifying grace as a created participation in and imitation of the active spiration 
of Father and Word lovingly breathing the Holy Spirit, while the habit of charity 
that flows from sanctifying grace is a created participation in and imitation of the 
passive spiration, the divine Proceeding Love, that is the Holy Spirit. This is one 
way of understanding the relation of gratia operans and gratia cooperans in the 
arder of habitual grace. 
1 have argued that it may be quite fruitful in many ways for us to pursue this 
possibility and to detail as precisely as we can the processions of act from act that 
would constitute emanatio intelligibilis in the arder of grace. 16 However, Lonergan 
is very clear in his agreement with the First Vatican Council that appropriate 
theological analogies are from what is naturally known, and so while there may 
be analogies within the supernatural arder of the mysteries themselves, and while 
it may be fruitful in the contemporary theological scene to stress these analogies 
- 1 am thinking here especially of furthering the possibilities between students of 
Lonergan and those of Hans Urs von Balthasar- still even these must be derived 
from the analogy with naturally known realities. Here is where the first psychological 
analogy in Lonergan' s work shows its permanent significance. lf there are indeed 
processions of act from act in the supernatural order, these can nevertheless be 
understood only by analogy with processions of act from act in human intelligent, 
rational, and moral consciousness. The argument can be made that nowhere in the 
theologicalliterature is there a clearer articulation of what precise! y is meant by the 
emanatio intelligibilis that constitutes the psychological analogy than in Lonergan's 
work. The most significant aspect of that claim for my present purpose is that it is 
precisely the account of decision presented in Insight that provides Lonergan's first 
psychological analogy from what is naturally known. 
This constitutes a second, theological argument for the permanent validity of 
chapter 18 of Insight. 
3. Existential Autonomy and lnterdividuality 
1 begin this section with a statement of psychiatrist Jean-Michel Oughourlian, 
in the dialogical encounter with René Girard published as Things Hzdden since the 
Foundation o/ the World: '[ ... ] the real human subject can only come out of the rule 
16 See Robert M. Doran, 'Being in Love with God: A Source of Analogies for Theological 
Understanding.' 
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of the Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and 
the "interdividual." Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure.'17 
The phrase 'the mimetic structure' refers to the account of acquisitive desire 
that Girard has been exposing for severa! decades, in various works of literary 
criticism, anthropology, psychology, and theological reflection. Very briefly, 
many of our desires are neither as spontaneous nor as autonomous as we like to 
believe, but originate rather in the desire of another whom we take as a model or 
mediator of our own desire. When the desire is acquisitive, that is, when I want 
what you have or want because you have or want it, the other becomes the rival, 
and attention is gradually removed from the object of the respective desires to 
focus more or less exclusive! y on the rivalry between the model and the imitator. 
Acquisitive mimesis has become conflictual mimesis, and conflictual mimesis is 
contagious within a community, leading eventually to the selection of an arbitrary 
victim or scapegoat, whose immolation, exclusion, or marginalization from the 
community restares peace at least temporarily and avoids the danger of escalating 
violence in the community. 
One possible initial heuristic structure for integrating the respective studies of 
human desire composed by Bernard Lonergan and René Girard may be specified by 
reference toa quotation from The Triune God: Systematics: '[. .. ] we are conscious 
in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what 
we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and 
sadness; in another way, through o.ur intellectuality, we are more active when we 
consciously inquire in arder to understand, understand in arder to utter a word, 
weigh evidence in arder to judge, deliberate in arder to choose, and exercise our 
will in arder to act.' 18 
The first way of being conscious is sensitive or psychic; the second is intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible. Both ways ofbeing conscious are also ways of desiring. 
The first entails a preponderance of 'undergoing,' while the second, though it surely 
involves passivity- 'intelligere est quoddam pati,' Lonergan repeats from Aquinas19 
- stresses as well and indeed highlights the self-governed and self-possessed 
unfolding of operations that is indicated by Lonergan's repetition of the phrase 'in 
arder to ... ' The first way appears more spontaneous, though if the 'undergoing' is 
interdividual this may be an illusion. The second shows greater autonomy, but only 
if it manifests what Oughourlian calls 'the real human subject,' the subject that has 
transcended the influence of the mimetic, however precariously. Por the two ways 
17 Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation o/the World (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) 199, emphasis in the text. Girard's response (ibid.): 'That is quite 
right.' 
18 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 139. 
19 Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas 142, quoting Thomas Aquinas, Super I Sententiarum , 
d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 sol, who himself is quoting Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 429a 13-15. 
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of being conscious interact, and the relative autonomy of the second way may be 
compromised by the gradual infiltration of mimetic desire into the performance 
of spiritual operations. A clear instance of how this may happen is illustrated by 
expanding on a comment in Max Scheler' s essay on ressentiment, an essay which 
may justly be interpreted, I believe, as foreshadowing Girard's work, in that Girard 
adds the crucial piece regarding mimesis. Scheler writes, 
Beyond all conscious lying and falsifying, there is a deeper 'organic mendacity.' 
Here the falsification is not formed in consciousness but at the same stage 
of the mental process as the impressions and value feelings themselves: on the 
road of experience into consciousness. There is 'organic mendacity' whenever a 
man' s mind admits only those impressions and feelings which serve his 'interest' 
or his instinctive attitude. Already in the process of mental reproduction and 
recollection, the contents of his experience are modified in this direction. He who 
is 'mendacious' has no need to líe! In his case, the automatic process of forming 
recollections, impressions, and feelings is involuntarily slanted, so that conscious 
falsification becomes unnecessary.20 
The expansion on this comment that I have in mind would stress that the very 
processions of act from act at the levels of intelligence, reason, and decision - the 
emergence of a word from insight, the emanation of a judgment from reflective 
grasp, the procession of a decision from the preceding acts- have already been 
derailed by an earlier distortion that reaches into the organic interdividuality of the 
less than 'real human subject' and occasions a deviation in the emergence of act 
from the potentiality of underlying manifolds all along the line. The distortion of 
the emergence of act from potency gives rise to a distortion also in the emergence 
of act from act.21 
The first way ofbeing conscious and of desiring is more (though not exclusively) 
characterized by the emergence of act from potency, and the second more (though 
not exclusively) by the emergence of act from act, by emanatio intelligibilis, 
intelligible emanation or what I prefer to call autonomous spiritual procession. 
Girard specializes in clarifying the first of these ways ofbeing conscious, emphasizing 
its intersubjective or 'interdividual' character, while Lonergan has explored the 
second perhaps more acutely and thoroughly ( to say nothing of more accurately) 
than any other thinker. 
Precisely because of the interplay between these two dimensions of interiority 
and desire, Girard regards . as illusory most of our attempts to describe our acts, 
including our intentional operations, as either spontaneous or autonomous. 
In the first book-length presentation of his theory of mimetic desire, Mensonge 
20 Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1961) 77-78. 
21 Questions raised by Fred Lawrence prompted this articulation, which needs further development. 
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-
romantique et vérité romanesque, translated into English as Deceit) Desire and 
the Novel, he speaks of the illusion that our desires are spontaneous inclinations 
toward attractive objects.22 But the same illusion is spoken of there as the 'illusion 
of autonomy.'23 Asan illusion of spontaneity, the desire is imagined to be 'deeply 
rooted in the object and in this object alone.'24 As an illusion of autonomy, it is 
thought to be 'rooted in the subject.' In fact the two delineations of the illusion 
cover over the same fact, namely, that the desire has been mediated by another and 
is contaminated by mimetic contagian. 
In a recent paper delivered at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, I 
proposed sorne considerations to enable us to make our way through these complex 
relations. 1 will repeat these suggestions here in summary fashion. 
First, Lonergan speaks of the need for a fourfold differentiation of consciousness 
required if we are to replace classicism with an acceptable Weltanschauung 
for our time, in which 'the workings of common sense, science, scholarship, 
intentionality analysis, and the life of prayer ha ve been integrated. '25 But as 1 have 
attempted to argue from the beginning of my own work, 'intentionality analysis' 
is one dimension of 'interiority analysis,' but not the only one. There is also the 
sensitive-psychological dimension, the conjugate intelligibilities that, if Girard 
is correct, reside largely in the intersubjective roots of Lonergan's first 'way of 
being conscious.' But in this context the word 'autonomy' can take on an added 
significance, beyond the salutary hermeneutic of suspicion that Girard exercises 
with regard to our illusions. There is a ·discussion of existential autonomy that 
appears in Lonergan's presentation of his analogy for the Trinitarian processions, 
and again it is rooted in the rationalexigence for self-consistency between knowing 
and doing that constitutes the notion of value in the ethics of Insight. 
Lonergan reaches a clear specification of the proper Trinitarian analogy through 
a series of disjunctions. The disjunctions, he says, will provide a set of criteria by 
which we may discern whether any given analogy is appropriate or not. The first 
six of these disjunctions may be treated vet;y briefly. 
In the first disjunction Lonergan establishes that we must move from the 
appropriation of sorne concrete mode of procession in human consciousness, 
rather than from an abstract definition of procession; in the second that any 
knowledge of divine procession must be analogical; in the third that the analogy 
must be systematic, that is, capable of resolving every other theoretical question in 
22 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Sel/ and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero 
(Baltimore: J ohns Hopkins, 197 6) 12. 
23 !bid., 16. 
24 Ibid., 12. 
2~ Bernard Lonergan, 'Doctrinal Pluralism,' in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol. 17 
in Collected Works ofBernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and RobertM. Doran (Toronto: University 
ofToronto Press, 2004). 
34 
Trinitarian theology; in the fourth that the analogy must be from what is naturally 
known; the fifth establishes that it must be from a specific nature, not from 
metaphysical common notions as in natural theology; and the sixth that that nature 
must be spiritual. 
The seventh disjunction brings us closer to the notion of autonomy. The seventh 
disjunction is between those spiritual processions in which act proceeds from 
potency and those in which act proceeds from act. Since in God there is only act, 
only the latter processions in human consciousness will provide an appropriate 
analogy. 'The analogy [ ... ] must be selected from the conscious originating of a 
real, natural, and conscious act, from a real, natural, and conscious act, within 
intellectual consciousness itself and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself. '26 
Such are the procession of conceptual syntheses from direct understanding, the 
procession of judgments of fact and of value from the grasp of sufficient grounds, 
and the procession of decisions from reflective grasp and the inner word of 
judgment that follows upon it. 
The eighth disjunction is between an appropriation of the dynamics of intellectual 
consciousness and a more distant metaphysical statement of cognitional fact. Only 
appropriation can enable us to distinguish the autonomous intellectual procession 
of act from act under the power of transcendental laws from the spontaneous 
intellectual procession of act from potency and from the spontaneous sensitive 
processions of act from both potency and act in accord with the laws specific to 
continuations of prehuman processes such as those manifested in primordial human 
intersubjectivity. Note that Lonergan has here introduced bis own meaning for the 
words 'spontaneous' and 'autonomous.' By 'autonomous intellectual procession 
of act from act' he is referring to a consciousness that is under rule or law only 
inasmuch as it is constituted by its own transcendental desire, to which there are 
attached what he carne to call the transcendental precepts. But by fidelity to these 
precepts such a consciousness 'rules itself inasmuch as under God's agency it 
determines itself to its own acts in accordance with the exigencies' of intelligence, 
rationality, and existential responsibility.27 
This, I propose, is the autonomy of what Oughourlian called the 'real human 
subject.' It does proceed from an intellectual spontaneity, namely, the conscious 
transcendental notion of being that is the native desire to know and the conscious 
transcendental notion of value that extends that native desire by force of a further 
question, a question in the existential arder. But that spontaneity becomes 
preceptive, and this is what converts the spontaneity into a genuine autonomy: 
not only do we raise questions, we must raise them; not only do we doubt, we must 
doubt; not only do we deliberate, we must deliberate. We must niise questions lest 
26 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 175. 
27 Ibid. 
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we pass judgment on what we do not understand; we must raise doubts lest we 
adhere to a false appearance of truth; we must deliberate lest we rush headlong to 
our own destruction.28 And it is in fidelity to the must, to the exigency into which the 
spontaneity has been transformed, that there emerges the only genuine autonomy 
of which the human subject is capable. That autonomy governs only sorne of the 
processions that occur in intelligent, rational, responsible consciousness, those 
processions in which act proceeds not from potency but from act. Such is the case 
with the autonomy of freedom whenever we choose because we ourselves judge 
and because our choice is in accordance with our judgment; such is the case with 
the autonomy of rationality whenever we judge because we grasp the evidence and 
because our judgment is in accord with the grasped evidence; such is the case with 
the autonomy of clarity whenever we define because we grasp the intelligible in the 
sensible and because our definition is in accord with grasped intelligibility.29 And 
it is only in the procession of act from act, and not in the procession of act from 
potency as in the emergence of insight from questions, that the proper analogy is 
found for understanding, however remotely, the Trinitarian processions: 'as is the 
case when a word arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of 
understanding, and a choice arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the 
act of judgment (that is, by a compound word).'30 
The ninth disjunction is tripartite, for such autonomy can be manifested in the 
realm of practica! intelligence and rationality, in the realm of speculative intelligence 
and rationality, and in the realm of existential self-determination through rational 
judgment and responsible choice. 'When one asks about the triune God, one is not 
considering God as creator or as agent, and so one is prescinding from practica! 
autonomy. Nor is one considering God insofar as God understands and judges 
and loves all things, and so one is prescinding from speculative matters. But one 
is considering God inasmuch as God is in himself eternally constituted as triune, 
and so one takes one' s analogy from the processions that are in accordance with the 
exercise of existential autonomy,' the autonomy in which one decides to operate 
in accord with the norms inherent in the unfolding of attentiveness, intelligence, 
rationality, and moral responsibility.31 That alone is the genuine autonomy of the 
'real human subject,' and while it is an autonomy that has transcended the mimetic 
structure of the interdividual and thus emerged into genuine subjectivity, it has not 
transcended every form of subordination or of imitation. Rather, 'the autonomy of 
human consciousness is indeed subordinate, not to every object whatsoever [and, 
we must add, not to every mimetic structure whatsoever], but to the infinite subject 
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in whose image it has been made and whom it is bound to imitate.'32 Even more 
precise! y, of course, we must emphasize that the autonomy of human consciousness 
has been made in the image and likeness not of one but of three infinite subjects 
of the one divine consciousness, and its genuine autonomy consists precisely in 
its fidelity to that image, issuing a word because it has understood something and 
moving to loving decision because that decision is in accord with the true value 
judgnient that is its verbum spirans amorem. In such fidelity there is imitation, but 
it is the imitation built into the image of the triune God, the imitation of the divine 
relations themselves. 
In the final analysis, then, the abiding significance of the ethics of Insight is found 
in the fact that it is a clear articulation of precise! y what constitutes the imitation of 
the Trinitarian relations that constitute us even in our human nature as images of 
God. By fidelity to the transcendental precepts, we move from mimetic contagian 
to an imitation of God that converts the deviated transcendence of mimetic rivalry 
and its false religion into the genuine transcendence of being in love with God. 
32 Ibid., 215. 
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